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Abstract—We consider a distributed multi-user system where
individual entities possess observations or perceptions of one
another, while the truth is only known to themselves, and they
might have an interest in withholding or distorting the truth. We
ask the question whether it is possible for the system as a whole
to arrive at the correct perceptions or assessment of all users,
referred to as their reputation, by encouraging or incentivizing
the users to participate in a collective effort without violating
private information and self-interest. Two specific applications,
online shopping and network reputation, are provided to motivate
our study and interpret the results. In this paper we investigate
this problem using a mechanism design theoretic approach. We
introduce a number of utility models representing users’ strategic
behavior, each consisting of one or both of a truth element
and an image element, reflecting the user’s desire to obtain an
accurate view of the other and an inflated image of itself. For
each model, we either design a mechanism that achieves the
optimal performance (solution to the corresponding centralized
problem), or present individually rational sub-optimal solutions.
In the latter case, we demonstrate that even when the centralized
solution is not achievable, by using a simple punish-reward
mechanism, not only a user has the incentive to participate and
provide information, but also that this information can improve
the system performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a distributed multi-user system where individ-
ual entities possess observations or perceptions of one another,
while the truth is only known to themselves, and they might
have an interest in withholding or distorting the truth. We
ask the question whether it is possible for the system as
a whole to arrive at the correct perceptions or assessment
of all users, referred to as their reputation, by encouraging
or incentivizing the users to participate in a collective effort
without violating private information and self-interest. In this
paper we investigate this problem using a mechanism design
theoretic approach [9], [18]. We will construct a sequence
of mechanisms and examine whether under each a user has
incentive to participate, and if they do what they would provide
as input, and whether ultimately their participation benefits the
system’s (global) assessment of all individuals.
While there are various possible applications of the above
problem, for the sake of concreteness we will focus on two
specific application instances to motivate our study as well as
to provide context within which our results can be interpreted.
The first application is a class of online trading or shop-
ping communities, where rating and reputation systems are
A preliminary version of this work appeared in GameNets 2012.
routinely used, e.g., eBay, Amazon, etc [16]. In this case, a
buyer forms an opinion about a seller through its interactions
with the latter, based on information such as the quality
and authenticity of the received product, timeliness of the
shipping process, quality of the packaging, post-sales customer
support, and so on. The buyer has the option to provide
feedback/recommendation to the site about the seller (a seller
may also be able to rate a buyer on promptness of payment);
two buyers’ view of the same seller can differ depending on
their respective experiences. A final reputation (e.g., in the
form of a score between 0 and 5) is calculated centrally by
the site, e.g., taking the sum of positive feedback minus the
sum of negative feedbacks, or through other similar methods
[16], [25]. It is also common for the site to display the entire
distribution/histograms of user input.
Despite their simplicity and relative effectiveness, such
methods have drawbacks, including the fact that not all buyers
provide feedback, and those who do may have a bias, e.g.,
toward positive ratings [16], [25]. On the other hand, the
sellers are aware of the specifics of all of their transactions
(true quality). This is an aspect that we seek to exploit in
this paper in contrast to prior work. Specifically, the crowd-
sourcing mechanisms developed in this paper are designed on
the principle of incentivizing and collecting inputs from both
buyers and sellers, on both themselves and others, with the end
goal of improving the accuracy of such reputation systems.
As we shall see there exist mechanisms whereby it is in the
interest of the sellers to provide useful, if not entirely truthful
input.
Our second application scenario comes from the use of
Internet host reputation block lists (RBLs). These lists are
constructed by a variety of systems developed to determine the
trustworthiness of a host by monitoring different types of data
for suspicious behavior. Examples of such systems include un-
solicited bulk email (SPAM) lists [14], [23], darknet monitors
[2], DNS sensors [1], scanning detection, firewall logs [7], web
access logs, and ssh brute force attack reports. These lists are
commonly used by network administrators to configure filters
or access control lists to control incoming and outgoing traffic.
At present such data is collected and the resulting reputation
lists are constructed by a handful of organizations in a way that
often lacks transparency. It is however not hard to envision the
establishment of a central system where such reputation data
can be provided by participating users much as in the online
shopping setting. Peer networks naturally possess observations
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2of each other through monitoring incoming and outgoing
traffic, and may be incentivized to provide input, so that
collectively the system may reach a more accurate assessment
on the “wellness” (a measure of trustworthiness, performance,
etc.) of each participant. In this context a participant in this
system can be a host or a network; in the latter case the
resulting reputation refers to the quality of a network (e.g.,
some form of aggregated reputation of hosts in that network).
Both the above applications, henceforth referred to as online
shopping and network reputation, respectively, share the fol-
lowing common features. A user in such a system can collect
statistics from its interactions with other users. From these
statistics it can form certain opinions about the quality or
trustworthiness of these other users, and its subsequent actions
may be taken based on such opinions. For instance, a user
may choose to limit future interactions with users who have
not had a satisfactory performance in the past. Such peer user-
user observations are often incomplete – a user does not get
to see the entire action profile of another user – and can be
biased. Thus two users’ view of a common third user may or
may not be consistent. The true quality or nature of a user
ultimately can only be known to that user itself (though it
is possible that a user may not have this knowledge due to
resource constraints). It is generally not in the user’s self-
interest to truthfully disclose this information: a user may
wish to inflate others’ perceptions about itself for obvious
reasons: a perceived high quality, or a better public image
typically translates into other more tangible benefits, e.g.,
higher sales for a seller in the online shopping application
and better visibility and reachability for a network in our
second application. Similarly, a user may or may not wish
to disclose truthfully what it observes about others for a
variety of considerations. On the other hand, it is typically
in the interest of a user to acquire the correct perceptions
about other users. This is because this correct view of others
can help the user determine appropriate actions, e.g., a buyer
naturally would like to conduct business with a trustworthy
seller, while a network needs to have the correct assessment
of other networks’ quality in order to make effective filter
configuration, routing and peering decisions, and so on.
The design and analysis of a reputation system to be used in
the above applications must observe two key features. The first
is that participation in such a system is completely voluntary,
and therefore it is critical for the system to adopt mechanisms
that can incentivize users to participate. The second is that
users may not report truthfully to the reputation agent even
if they choose to participate in such a collaborative effort,
and therefore it is crucial for any mechanism adopted by
the system to either provide the right incentive to induce
truthful revelation, or be able to function despite untruthful
input. These two features set the present study apart from
existing work on reputation systems, many of which take user
participation as a given (see e.g., the use of reputation in peer-
to-peer (P2P) systems). A detailed discussion on related work
and its relationship to the present paper is given in Section
VIII.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the reputation system model, different elements
of user utilities and some preliminaries. We present candidate
mechanisms for several environments of different user types
in Sections III-VI. In Section VII we discuss main insights
from these mechanisms as well as a few practical implemen-
tation issues. We review the literature of mechanism design,
elicitation methods, and reputation systems most relevant to
the present paper in Section VIII, and conclude in Section IX.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. The reputation system model
Consider a collection of K ≥ 2 entities1, denoted by
N1, N2, . . . , NK . A user Ni may refer to a buyer/seller in
an online shopping website, or a network in a system of
inter-connected networks. Each user Ni’s overall quality is
described by a quantity rii, which we refer to as the real or
true quality of Ni, or simply the truth. We assume without
loss of generality that rii ∈ [0, 1], for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
We assume that each user Ni is aware of its own conditions
and therefore knows rii precisely, but this is its private
information. We do note however that while it is technically
feasible for any entity to obtain rii by monitoring its own
actions/interactions (e.g. a seller can record the specifics of
all its transactions, a network can monitor its hosts and all
outgoing traffic), it is by no means always the case due to
reasons such as resource constraints.
There is a central reputation system that is responsible for
soliciting input from participants and coming up with the
system estimates. For instance, this could be the shopping
site in the online example and a certain commonly agreed
authority in the network reputation example. Specifically, the
system proposes a mechanism, according to which it collects
input from participants and uses it to build a global quality
assessment, in the form of a reputation index, for each of the
K users in the system. Its goal is to have the reputation index
reflect the true quality rii as accurately as possible.
In general, each user Nj independently monitors its in-
teractions with another user Ni to form an estimate Rji
based on its observations. For example, a buyer may keep
track of their shopping experience with seller Ni. Similarly, a
network Nj can monitor the inbound traffic from network Ni
to form an opinion. However, Nj’s observation is in general
an incomplete view of Ni, and may contain error depending
on the monitoring and estimation technique used. We will
thus assume that Rji is described by a Normal distribution
N (µji, σ2ji), which itself may be unbiased (µji = rii) or
biased (µji 6= rii) (The assumption of a Normal distribution
is made for simplicity and concreteness, and is not necessary
for all of our results.). We will further assume that this
distribution is known to user Ni but not necessarily to Nj
(i.e., it is known to the observed but not the observer), the
reason being that Ni can in principle closely monitor its own
actions/interactions with Nj and therefore may sufficiently
infer how it is perceived by others.
The reputation system itself may also be able to monitor
the actions of each user Ni so as to form its own estimate of
1 We will subsequently use the terms users, entities and participants
interchangeably.
3Ni’s condition. This will be denoted by R0i, again a random
variable for the same reason given above. The system’s obser-
vations can be gathered by a random auditing of transactions in
an online shopping community, or by monitoring the outgoing
traffic of a network in the network reputation example. As
before we will assume that R0i is Normally distributed with
N (µ0i, σ20i), and that this distribution is known to user Ni.
The reputation system operates as follows. It may collect
a vector (xij)j∈K of reports from each user Ni. It con-
sists of cross-reports xij , i, j = 1, · · · ,K, j 6= i, which
represent Ni’s assessment of Nj’s quality, and self-reports
xii, i = 1, 2, · · · ,K, which are the users’ self-advertised
quality measure. As we will see in subsequent sections the
mechanism may be such that only a subset of these reports
are collected. Furthermore, there is no a priori guarantee that
the participants will report truthfully any of these quantities.
The reputation system’s goal is to derive the reputation
index for each user Ni so as to accurately reflect the true
quality rii. This objective is quite different from what’s
commonly studied, e.g., revenue maximization. Toward this
end, we consider two possible ways of defining a reputation
index: (1) an absolute index rˆAi as an estimate of rii, and
(2) a proportional or relative index rˆRi . For instance, given
true quantities rii, i = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ideally Ni’s proportional
reputation index is given by rii∑
k
rkk
.
Mathematically, the reputation mechanism is designed to
solve the following problem:
min
∑
i
|rˆAi − rii| or min
∑
i
|rˆRi −
rii∑
k rkk
| . (1)
Here we have used the absolute error as a performance
measure; other error functions may be adopted as well. This
will not change most of our subsequent analysis.
To highlight the difference between these two types of
indices, note that when using absolute reputation indices, each
user’s final reputation rˆAi is independent of other users’ qual-
ity assessment, while proportional indices create competition
among participants. Indeed under proportional indexing users
may be viewed as competing for a common pool of resources
(the sum total of all index values). Proportional indexing in
effect leads to a ranking system which may be useful in some
cases. On the other hand absolute indexing may be more
relevant when used by a user to regulate its interactions with
another; e.g., a buyer may refrain from shopping from poorly
reputed sellers on an absolute scale even though some of them
may look good by comparison. Similarly, a network may wish
to tighten its security measure against all those with indices
below a threshold, which could be the whole set or an empty
set, rather than those with the poorest reputation indices by
comparison.
A reputation mechanism specifies a method used by the
reputation system to compute the reputation indices, i.e., what
input to solicit and how the input are used to generate output
estimates. As users are entities acting in self-interest and the
truth is their own private information, the key to a successful
mechanism (one that attains the solution to (1)) is to induce
the users to provide useful, if not entirely truthful, input.
Such a reputation mechanism will also be referred to as a
collective revelation mechanism, a term borrowed from [11]. It
is assumed that the mechanism is common knowledge among
all K participating users.
In what follows we give a brief overview of the mechanism
design formalism, followed by the types of utility functions
representing individual users.
B. The mechanism design framework: an overview
The theory of mechanism design [18, Ch. 23], [9, Ch. 7],
addresses the problem of choosing the rules of a game
according to the preferences of a set of agents/users, so that
a desirable outcome is achieved at the equilibrium points of
the resulting game. It is typically used to solve a decentralized
resource allocation problem. Formally, the goal of a mecha-
nism is to achieve the solution to a centralized problem in an
informationally decentralized system. The centralized problem
is described by a triple (E ,A, γ), where:
• E is the set of all possible environments for the problem,
consisting of all the information or circumstances in the
model that are uncontrolled. In our model, an environ-
ment e consists of the utility functions, the real quality
of the participants, the number of participating networks,
etc.
• A, the allocation space, is the space of all feasible
outcomes of the game. In our model, an allocation space
may be the set of all feasible reputation index profiles
of the form {rˆAi ∈ [0, 1]}Ki=1 in the case of absolute
indexing, and possibly tax profiles of the form {ti}Ki=1
(to be detailed shortly).
• γ, the goal correspondence, is a mapping γ : E → A
that achieves some desired performance goal, e.g., the
maximization of a social choice rule.
In an informationally decentralized system, the mechanism
designer chooses the game form (M, h), where:
• M = ΠKi=1Mi, with Mi denoting the message space of
user i.
• h :M→A is the outcome function. This function is the
rule according to which the mechanism uses the collected
input messages to compute the final allocation.
Define ξ(M, h, e) as the outcome at the equilibrium point2
of the game induced by (M, h) when the realization of
the environment is e ∈ E . The game form is chosen such
that ξ(M, h, e) ⊆ γ(e). In other words, the induced game
implements in its equilibrium the solution to the centralized
allocation problem.
In addition to implementing the desired outcome, a game
form is often required to satisfy other properties. One such
desirable property is budget balance. Note that in order to
induce individuals to behave in such a way that the solution to
the centralized problem is obtained, the mechanism typically
needs some type of leverage. The precise form of this leverage
varies from problem to problem (see more discussion in Sec-
tion VIII), but the most commonly used leverage is taxation,
an amount ti imposed on user i: a user is taxed/punished
2Note that the appropriate equilibrium concept depends on the model; we
will highlight this within each model we study.
4(ti > 0) for bad behavior and credited/rewarded (ti < 0) for
good behavior; a user’s valuation of tax (monetary payout) is
assumed public knowledge. How taxation if invoked may be
implemented in our problem context is discussed in Section
VII.
A balanced budget refers to the fact that at equilibrium
all money collected (tax) equals all money paid out (credit);
i.e., the system running the mechanism neither profits nor
subsidizes but merely uses taxation as a regulatory tool. By
contrast, a budget deficit implies that the system needs to
inject money into the system, while a budget surplus means
that some amount of money will be left unclaimed. For this
reason, it is desirable to reallocate the paid taxes in the form of
subsidies and ensure a balanced budget, i.e. to have
∑
i ti = 0.
More importantly, it is desirable to design a mechanism
that is individually rational: a user benefits from participation.
In other words, the expected utility from playing the game
induced by the mechanism should exceed the reserved utility
a user gets when staying out. We next introduce the types of
utility functions considered in this study.
C. Individual users’ objectives
In modeling the users’ objectives, we identify two elements
of a user’s utility or preference model.
• Truth: Each user Ni may wish to obtain from the system
as accurate as possible an estimate on users Nj other
than itself. Formally,
Ii = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆAj − rjj |) ,
Ii = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆRj −
rjj∑
k rkk
|) ,
for absolute and proportional/relative reputation indices,
respectively. Here, fi(·) ≥ 0 are increasing and convex
functions.
This element captures a user’s interest in having accurate
assessment of other users’ quality so that it can properly
regulate its actions. For instance, it is important for a
buyer (or trader) to know the history of a seller’s (or
potential partner’s) transactions. Similarly, it would be
important for a consumer-based network like Comcast
whose customers connect to various networks/sites to
have an accurate view of these other networks.
• Image: Each user Ni may further wish to obtain as high
as possible an estimate on itself. Formally,
IIi = gi(rˆ
A
i ) , IIi = gi(rˆ
R
i ),
for absolute and proportional reputation indices respec-
tively, where gi(·) ≥ 0 are concave and increasing.
This element reflects a user’s interest in having a high
reputation itself as it translates into other tangible benefits
as mentioned earlier. For instance, a seller is interested
in attracting costumers by building a good reputation
and increasing its visibility. Similarly, this objective can
capture a content-centric network like Craigslist or a blog
hosting site, for which staying visible to the outside world
is critical and who may reserve the right to block users
from certain networks.
A general preference model of a legitimate, non-malicious
user may consist of both elements, possibly weighted; that is,
user Ni may be captured by
ui = −λ
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆAj − rjj |) + (1− λ)gi(rˆAi ) (2)
for some constant 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (and similarly for relative
reputation indices).
It is interesting to note the two extreme cases: (1) There are
users that are only concerned with truth (λ = 1), e.g. a buyer
on Amazon, or a closed network such as a DoD network that
has strict requirement on which external sites it is allowed
to connect to but does not care about its own image to the
outside world. These users will be referred to as the truth
type. (2) There are also users that are only concerned with
their images (λ = 0), e.g. a seller on Amazon, or a phishing
site that tries to maximize its reputation in order to attract
more traffic. These users will be referred to as the image type.
The more general model that consists of both will be referred
to as a mixed type. Examples of mixed type users include
a user in an online trading community; or a seller on eBay,
who in addition to gaining popularity by a high reputation,
benefits from using the knowledge of the reputation of buyers
to ensure receiving the promised payments. With the above
classifications, depending on the makeup of the system, we
may have a homogeneous environment where all participants
are of the same type, or a heterogeneous environment with a
mixture of different types.
By defining these two utility elements, we assume a user’s
preference is in general increasing in the accuracy of others’
quality estimate, and increasing in its own quality estimate. We
assume these two characteristics to be public knowledge. How
the preference increases with these estimates and how these
two elements are weighed, i.e. the functional forms of fi(·)
and gi(·), remain user Ni’s private information in general.
It should be noted that rˆAj (and similarly rˆ
R
j ) is a func-
tion of the proposed game form (M, hA), such that, rˆAj =
hA(m1,m2, . . . ,mK), with mj denoting Nj’s message. Since
the proposed model is one of incomplete information, from
Ni’s viewpoint, the message profile m ∈M, and consequently
ui, is in general a random variable. Therefore, it is understood
that Ni is an expected-utility maximizer. Also, if a user Ni is
charged a tax in the amount ti according to the specific mech-
anism, then Ni’s aggregate utility is given by vi := ui − ti.
Note that the utility model assumed above may not capture
the nature of a malicious user, who may or may not care
about the estimated perceptions about itself or others. This is
discussed further in Section VII.
D. Solution to the centralized problem
For the centralized problem given in (1), if the reputation
system has full information about all the parameters in the
system, then the optimal choice of the absolute and pro-
portional reputation indices would simply be rˆAi = rii and
rˆRi =
rii∑
k
rkk
, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,K, respectively.
5In subsequent sections we show how to design a reputation
mechanism in a decentralized scenario, for various combina-
tions of the utility elements described in Section II-C, such that
the centralized solution is an equilibrium of the resulting game
when played by the users, or to find a suboptimal mechanism
when the centralized solution cannot be implemented.
III. TRUTH TYPE, ABSOLUTE REPUTATION
Our first case deals with a homogeneous environment in
which all users are of the truth type, with the following utility
function:
(Model I) ui = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆAj − rjj |) . (3)
Below we first present a mechanism that can achieve the
centralized solution rˆAi = rii, and then discuss the properties
of the game it induces.
A. The Absolute Scoring Mechanism
The Absolute Scoring (AS) mechanism consists of the
following components:
• Message spaceM: each user reports a single value xii ∈
[0, 1] as its message.
• Outcome function h(·): The reputation system sets the
reputation indices rˆAi = xii,∀i.
• In addition, user Ni is levied a tax in the amount ti based
on its own report xii, other reports xjj , j 6= i, and the
system’s own observation R0i:
ti = |xii −R0i|2 − 1
K − 1
∑
j 6=i
|xjj −R0j |2. (4)
The rationale behind this mechanism is as follows: the system
assigns the reputation assuming truthful reports; at the same
time it ensures that the reports are indeed truthful by choosing
the appropriate format for the tax transfer, partly utilizing its
own knowledge.
B. Properties of the AS mechanism
As discussed earlier, our objective in designing a mechanism
is to design a game form that implements the centralized
solution. Therefore, we first verify that truth-telling is an equi-
librium of the induced game. Under our model the resulting
game is a game of incomplete information: each user only
knows its own environment and has a belief (i.e. a probability
distribution) on the set of environments of all participating
agents (i.e. the other users as well as the reputation sys-
tem). Therefore, truth-telling should be implemented in either
Bayesian Nash equilibrium or dominant strategies.
Proposition 1: Truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the
game induced by the Absolute Scoring mechanism.
Proof: We need to show that Ni’s expected utility when
choosing the message xii under any strategy profile {xjj}j 6=i
for all other users, is maximized at xii = rii. Ni’s expected
utility is given by:
E [vi(xii, {xjj}j 6=i)] = −
∑
j 6=i
E[fi(|rˆAj − rjj |)]
−E[ |xii −R0i|2] + 1K−1
∑
j 6=i
E[|xjj −R0j |2] (5)
It can be easily seen that Ni’s report xii can only adjust the
second term in (5) regardless of other participants’ strategies.
Ni is a self-utility maximizer, therefore xii is chosen so as
to minimize the second term, i.e., minimize the punishment
due to discrepancy w.r.t to the system’s observation. By
assumption, Ni knows that R0i ∼ N (rii, σ20i)3, and it is easy
to see that the optimal choice is indeed xii = rii.
In addition to implementing the centralized solution in dom-
inant strategies, the AS mechanism is also budget balanced and
individually rational. To see the first property, note that by (4)
the system is simply charging each user by their inaccuracy as
compared to its own observation, and then redistributing the
gathered fees among the other participants.
Before addressing the individual rationality requirement, we
note that as described in Model I, Ni is interested in a vector
of reputation indices that will help it regulate its interactions
with other users Nj , j 6= i. Therefore, our argument depends
on the environment Ei, i.e., the information that Ni initially
holds about the system’s parameters.
Proposition 2: The AS mechanism is individually rational
for all possible environments e ∈ E .
Proof: As discussed in Section II, a user Ni is able to
obtain its own observation Rij on Nj’s true quality, such
that the best estimate Ni can form on rjj is an unbiased
observation Rij ∼ N (rjj , σ2ij). Consequently, its expected
reserved utility is given by −∑j 6=iE(fi(|Rij − rjj |)) if
it chooses to stay out of the system. On the other hand,
participation will result in an expected utility of −∑j 6=i fi(0)
at equilibrium. Since by assumption fi(·) is convex, we have,
∀j 6= i,
E[fi(|Rij − rjj |)] ≥ fi(E(|Rij − rjj |))
= fi(
√
2
pi
σij)
> fi(0) ∀j 6= i , (6)
where the last inequality is due to the fact fi(·) is an increas-
ing function. Thus the proposed mechanism is individually
rational.
It is interesting to note that in this scenario, the solution
rˆAi = rii is both socially and individually optimal. Therefore,
it should come as no surprise that the AS mechanism manages
to implement the socially optimal solution while being incen-
tive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced.
C. The Extended-AS Mechanism
We end this section by presenting an extension to the
AS mechanism when the reputation system does not possess
direct observations. Specifically, the reputation system adopts
a random ring, which may be made explicit to the users or
kept secret from them (some implications of this choice are
discussed in section VII-E).
Assume users are re-labeled according to their positions on
this ring, such that Ni+1 follows Ni and so on. The self-
report of a user is then validated using the cross-report from
3Assuming unbiased observations. If cross-observations are biased, the
analysis will depend on which entities have a knowledge about the existence
and/or distribution of such bias.
6its predecessor on the ring. More specifically, each user Ni is
asked to provide a self-report xii (which will be assigned as its
reputation index rˆAi ), and cross-reports xij , only one of which
– xi(i+1) for its successor Ni+1 – is used in the mechanism.
Ni is then levied a tax based on the discrepancy between its
self-report and the cross-report x(i−1)i, given by:
ti = |xii − x(i−1)i| − 1
K − 2
∑
j 6=i,i+1
|xjj − x(j−1)j | .
The summation term in ti is a share of taxes collected from
users other than Ni and its immediate neighbor, ensuring
budget balance.
We now verify that these tax terms lead to truthful self-
reports and cross-reports. Furthermore, the mechanism is in-
dividually rational, and implements the centralized solution in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that the aggregate utility of
Ni in the extended-AS mechanism is given by:
vi = −
∑
j 6=i,i+1
fi(|xjj − rjj |)− fi(
∣∣x(i+1)(i+1) − r(i+1)(i+1)∣∣)
−|xii − x(i−1)i|+ 1
K − 2
∑
j 6=i,i+1
|xjj − x(j−1)j | .
Proposition 3: The Extended-AS mechanism results in
truthful self-reports and cross-reports.
Proof: First, let’s consider the self-report xii: this report
appears only in the term |xii − x(i−1)i|. To minimize the
expected value of this term (maximize E[vi]), Ni chooses
xii = E[x(i−1)i]. Therefore if the cross-report x(i−1)i is
truthful, Ni will provide the truthful self-report xii = rii.
Following the previous argument, Ni+1 will also choose
x(i+1)(i+1) = arg minxE(|x − xi(i+1)|) . Ni submits the
unbiased Ri(i+1), by predicting that a truthful self-report is
a best-response to unbiased cross-observations. This incen-
tivizes Ni+1 to reveal r(i+1)(i+1).
We conclude that the centralized solution rˆAi = rii is imple-
mented in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Individual rationality
follows from Proposition 2, since the expected value of the
tax term is zero.
IV. TRUTH TYPE, RELATIVE REPUTATION
We now turn to the case where the reputation system seeks
to calculate relative/proportional indices for a homogeneous
environment consisting of K truth type participants, with
utility functions given by:
(Model II) ui = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆRj −
rjj∑
k rkk
|) . (7)
Consider the following Fair Ranking (FR) mechanism:
• Message space M: each user reports one value xii ∈
[0, 1] as its self-advertised reputation.
• The outcome function h(·): the system assigns the propor-
tional reputations rˆRi =
xii∑
k
xkk
. No taxes are assessed.
It turns out the above mechanism achieves the centralized
solution rii∑
k
rkk
as stated formally in the next proposition.
In essence, this is an incentive compatible direct mechanism
in which truthfully reporting the real quality is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4: Truthful revelation is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of the Fair Ranking mechanism.
Proof: Consider Ni’s utility from reporting xii when all
other users are truthfully disclosing their real quality rkk, k 6=
i. We have:
ui(xii, {rkk}k 6=i) = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(| rjj(xii−rii)(xii+∑
k 6=i rkk)(
∑
k
rkk)
|). (8)
By assumption, fi(·) is an increasing function, and therefore
Ni’s best response is to report xii = rii. Note that this result is
achievable without the need for cross-observations from other
users, direct observations by the system itself, or taxation.
It is interesting to highlight the difference between Models
I and II. While both models are based on the same utility
type (truth) and the centralized, full information solution is
implementable in both cases, under Model II the mechanism
induces truth-telling without the need to impose taxes. This
is due to the fact that with proportional indices, a user’s
report influences other users’ allocation, an effect missing
in the case of absolute indices. The outcome obtained as a
result of this effect is rather intuitive: when all individuals
are interested in establishing a fair ranking system (Model II),
truthful revelation is the best strategy for all.
V. MIXED TYPE, ABSOLUTE REPUTATION
Our last homogeneous case deals with the mixed type with
absolute reputation given by the following utility function:
(Model III) ui = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆAj − rjj |) + gi(rˆAi ) . (9)
A. An impossibility result
As in the case of Model I noted earlier, Model III also leads
to a game of incomplete information, therefore the appropriate
equilibrium concept is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A
necessary condition for a goal correspondence to be truthfully
implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an economic
environment, is Bayesian incentive compatibility of that goal
correspondence [15], [18, Ch. 23], defined as follows (recall
the goal correspondence γ achieving the centralized solution
is γ(e) = {rii}Ki=1):
A social choice correspondence γ : E → A is Bayesian
incentive compatible if and only if for every i ∈ K,∫
E−i
ui(γ(ei, e−i))p(e−i|ei)de−i
≥
∫
E−i
ui(γ(e
′
i, e−i))p(e−i|ei)de−i . (10)
This means that (for our model) any social choice func-
tion that is not Bayesian incentive compatible cannot be
implemented in BNE. Below we show that the desired goal
correspondence for Model III does not satisfy (10), thus there
is no game form that can achieve the allocation rˆAi = rii, and
that the centralized solution is not implementable under this
model.
7Assume the realized environment of user Ni is ei ∈ Ei,
and according to this environment, the true quality of Ni is
rii. Therefore, the resulting optimal solution as prescribed by
γ(·) is to have γ(ei, e−i) = (rii, {rjj}j 6=i). If however, Ni
misrepresents its environment by claiming the true quality is
r′ii > rii, the allocation would be γ(ei, e−i) = (r
′
ii, {rjj}j 6=i).
This change does not affect the first term in the utility
function, while causing the second term to increase since by
assumption gi(·) is an increasing function. This in turn means
(10) does not hold. In other words, any mechanism under this
model inevitably has some performance gap compared to the
centralized solution in terms of its mean absolute error (MAE)
as given in the centralized objective function.
B. The use of self-reports and cross-reports
In view of the impossibility result, we next set out to
construct a good, suboptimal mechanism. We will invoke the
use of both self-reports and cross-reports, and will forgo the
use of taxation for simplicity. As we shall see later, even
though the system’s own observation R0i is sufficient in
implementing our mechanism, more cross-reports can improve
the performance of the mechanism when used properly.
We first introduce a simple, benchmark mechanism, referred
to as the simple averaging mechanism, where the reputation
agent solicits cross-reports xji, and computes the estimate rˆAi
as the average of xji for j 6= i and its own observation
R0i. This is the basic mechanism used in many existing
online systems, e.g., Amazon and Epinions [16]. The following
proposition shows that for this mechanism, Nj will choose to
truthfully disclose its observation Rji.
Proposition 5: Under the simple averaging mechanism,
truthful revelation of the observation Rji, by Nj , j 6= i is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Note that a user Nj has no influence on its
own estimate rˆAj , which is only a function of other users’
input. Thus in effect Nj’s objective is to minimize the error
fj(|rˆAi − rii|) for all other network Ni. The simple averaging
mechanism will result in rˆAi =
∑
k∈K\i Rki+R0i
K , which for
unbiased estimates Rki, will also be an unbiased estimator of
rii, i.e. rˆAi ∼ N (rii, σ
2
K ). Any deviation by Nj will shift the
mean of rˆAi , thus degrading the estimate and increasing the
error.
If the estimates Rji, for j ∈ K\i, are unbiased, then rˆAi can
be made arbitrarily close to rii as the number of participants
increases. It’s not hard to see that under this mechanism, if
asked, Ni will always report xii = 1, and thus the self-reports
will bear no information.
Alternatively, we could seek to build a mechanism that
incentivizes Ni to provide a useful self-report even if it is
not the precise truth rii. With this in mind, a good mechanism
might on one hand convince Ni that it can help contribute to a
desired, high estimate rˆAi by supplying input xii, while on the
other hand try to use the cross-reports, which are estimates
of the truth rii, to assess Ni’s self-report and threaten with
punishment if it is judged to be overly misleading.
Furthermore, it is desirable for the mechanism to be such
that Ni’s cross-reports are not used in deriving its own
reputation. By doing so, we ensure that the cross-reports are
reported truthfully4. To see why this is the case, note that
by sending its cross-report on Nj , Ni can now only hope to
increase its utility by altering the term fi(|rˆAj −rjj |). Ni’s best
estimate of rjj is its cross-observation Rij , which it knows
will be used as a basis for the estimate rˆAj . On the other hand,
due to its lack of knowledge of rjj , Ni cannot determine how
to manipulate xij so as to increase its utility. By this argument,
for the rest of this section we will assume that the cross-reports
are reported truthfully under the Model III utility type, and that
this is common knowledge.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the above argument is
based on the direct effect of the cross-reports on the final
reputation. One might argue that Ni could exploit the indirect
effect of its cross-report by badmouthing other users so as
to improve its relative position in the system, i.e., make itself
look better by comparison. However, there is no clear incentive
for Ni to do so, since the current model is one of absolute,
rather than proportional reputations.
But more importantly and perhaps more subtly, bad-
mouthing another user is not necessarily in the best interest
of an individual. Suppose that after sending a low cross-report
xij , Ni subsequently receives a low rˆAj from the reputation
system. Due to its lack of knowledge of other users’ cross-
reports, Ni cannot reasonably tell whether this low estimate rˆAj
is a consequence of its own low cross-report, or if it is because
Nj was observed to be poor(er) by other users and thus rˆAj is in
fact reflecting Nj’s true quality (unless a set of users collude
and jointly target a particular individual). This ambiguity is
against Ni’s interest in obtaining accurate estimates of other
users; therefore bashing is not a profitable deviation from
truthful reporting. In essence, the desire for truth (accuracy)
gives the system leverage in designing a mechanism even if
it’s only part of the user’s objective. This is discussed further
in Section VII.
C. The punish-reward (PR) mechanism
Consider the following way of computing the reputation
index rˆAi for Ni. The system uses its own observation R0i,
along with the received cross-reports Rji, to judge Ni’s self-
report. In the simplest case, the system can take the average of
all these estimations to get x¯0i :=
Σj∈K\ixji+R0i
K , and derive
rˆAi using:
rˆAi (xii, x¯0i) =
{
x¯0i+xii
2 if xii ∈ [x¯0i − , x¯0i + ],
x¯0i − |x¯0i − xii| if xii /∈ [x¯0i − , x¯0i + ].
(11)
where  is a fixed and known constant. In words, the reputation
system takes the average of the self-report xii and the aggre-
gate cross-report x¯0i if the two are sufficiently close, or else
punishes Ni for reporting significantly differently. We refer to
this mechanism as the punish-reward mechanism. Note that
this is only one of many possibilities that reflect the idea of
weighing between averaging and punishing; for instance, we
4This is conceptually similar to not using a user’s own bid in calculating
the price charged to him in the context of auction, a technique commonly
used to induce truthful implementation.
8can also choose to punish only when the self-report is higher
than the cross-report, and so on.
Next we examine the strategic behavior of the users when
playing the induced game. Throughout the analysis, we will
assume that all cross-observations are unbiased and are re-
ported truthfully as argued in the previous sub-section, i.e.,
xji ∼ N (rii, σ2), j ∈ K\i and R0i ∼ N (rii, σ2).5
D. Value of cross-report and self-report
Since Ni knows the distribution of the observations Rji,
it will assume the aggregate cross-report is a sample of a
distribution N (µ, σ′2), with µ = rii and σ′2 = σ2K . The choice
of the self-report xii is then determined by the solution to the
optimization problem maxxii E[gi(rˆ
A
i )].
To simplify the following calculation, we will take the
special case gi(x) = x. The analysis can be easily extended to
other functional forms of gi(·). Using (11), E[rˆAi ] eventually
simplifies to (with F () and f() denoting the cdf and pdf of
x¯0i, respectively):
E[rˆAi ] = xii +

2 (F (xii + )− 3F (xii − ))
− 12
∫ xii+
xii−
F (x)dx− 2
∫ xii−
−∞
F (x)dx . (12)
Taking the derivative with respect to xii, we get:
dE[rˆAi ]
dxii
= 1 +

2
[f(xii + )− 3f(xii − )]
− 1
2
[F (xii + ) + 3F (xii − )]. (13)
We next re-write  = aσ′; this expression of  reflects how
the reputation system can limit the variation in the self-report
using its knowledge of this variation σ′. Replacing  = aσ′ and
x¯0i ∼ N (µ, σ′2) in (13), and making the change of variable
y := xii−µaσ′ results in:
a√
2pi
(e
−( a(y+1)√
2
)2 − 3e−(
a(y−1)√
2
)2
)
−1
2
(erf(
a(y + 1)√
2
) + 3erf(
a(y − 1)√
2
)) = 0 . (14)
Therefore, if y solves (14) for a given a, the optimal value
for xii would be x∗ii = µ+aσ
′y. Equation (14) can be solved
numerically for a, resulting in Fig. 1.
Two interesting observations can be made from Fig. 1: (1)
0 < y < 1, and (2) as a consequence µ < x∗ii < µ + .
This means that Ni chooses to inflate its self-report in hope
of inflating rˆAi , while trying to stay within its prediction of
the acceptable range.
5Note that we are assuming σ is common, and known by the reputation
system as well as the participants. σ can be thought of as a measure of
the variation of the estimates on Ni, which depends on the nature of the
observations and the algorithm used for the estimate. While this is not an
unreasonable assumption, verification using real data is desired which is
currently being pursued in a parallel effort.
E. Properties of the PR mechanism
We first compare the performance of (11) to the simple
averaging mechanism. Define em := E[|rˆAi −rii|] as the MAE
of the mechanism described in (11) with  = aσ′. Assuming
the optimal self-report x∗ii, and unbiased, truthful cross-reports,
it is possible to find the expression for em as a function of the
parameter a. We can thus optimize the choice of a by solving
the problem mina em. Taking the derivative of em we get:
dem
da
= σ
′
2
(
a√
2pi
(e−
(a(y+1))2
2 − 3e− (a(y−1))
2
2 ) + (ay + y′)(
erf( ay√
2
)− 1
2
(erf(a(y+1)√
2
)− 3erf(a(y−1)√
2
))
+
a√
2pi
(e−
(a(y+1))2
2 + 3e−
(a(y−1))2
2 ) + 2
))
. (15)
As seen in (15), the optimal choice of a does not depend
on the specific values of µ and σ′. Therefore, the same
mechanism can be used for any set of users. Equation (15)
can be solved numerically, reflecting that the minimum error
is achieved at a ≈ 1.7. This can be seen from Fig. 2, which
shows the MAE of the PR mechanism compared to that of the
averaging mechanism. Under the simple averaging mechanism
the MAE is E[|x¯0i − rii|] =
√
2
piσ
′. We see that for a large
range of a values the PR mechanism given in (11) results in
smaller estimation error. This suggests that Ni’s self-report
can significantly benefit the system as well as all users other
than Ni.
We have now verified the PR mechanism as a suboptimal
solution to the centralized problem (1) under Model III. It is
clearly budget balanced as no taxation is invoked. We next
check whether there is incentive for Ni to provide its self-
report, i.e., does this benefit Ni itself? Fig. 3 compares Ni’s
estimated reputation rˆAi under the proposed mechanism to that
under the averaging mechanism6, in which case it is simply
the average of all observations on Ni, and E[x¯0i] = rii when
unbiased.
Taking Figs. 2 and 3 together, we see that there is a region,
a ∈ [2, 2.5] in which the presence of the self-report helps
Ni obtain a higher reputation index, while helping the system
reduce its estimation error on Ni. This is a region that is
mutually beneficial to both Ni and the system, and Ni clearly
has an incentive to participate and provide its self-report.
It remains an interesting problem and a challenge to find
the mechanism that results in the smallest performance gap, if
it exists, compared to the solution to the centralized problem
(1).
F. An extension to the PR mechanism
A variation on the preceding PR mechanism would be to
use the weighted mean of the cross-reports instead of a simple
average:
x¯0i :=
∑
j∈K\i wjxji∑
j∈K\i wj
(16)
6In calculating the reserved utility, we have assumed that in the event
Ni chooses to stay out of the game, the reputation system will use simple
averaging on the gathered cross-observations to estimate Ni’s reputation
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where w := (wj)j∈K\i is a vector of weights, also specified
by the reputation system. One reasonable choice for w could
be a vector of previously computed reputations rˆAj , with the
intention of allowing the more reputable users to have a
higher influence on the estimates. Similar ideas are commonly
used in rating/ranking systems. We proceed by analyzing the
performance of this alternative mechanism.
Assume xji ∼ N(rii, σ2ji), i.e., all users have an unbiased
view of Ni, but with potentially different accuracy as reflected
by different values of σji, with smaller variances correspond-
ing to more precise estimates. In the special case σji = σ,
∀j, it can be shown that the weighted average will (regardless
of the choice of w) increase the variance of the aggregated
cross-report, and thus the estimation error. What this implies
is that users with equally accurate views should be given the
same power to affect the outcome.
On the other hand, if σji’s are different for differ-
ent users, then choosing w such that
∑
j∈K\i wj
2σ2ji ≤∑
j∈K\i
1
(K−1)2σ
2
ji results in a lower variance, and thus a
lower estimation error. This rearrangement shows clearly that
for the inequality to hold, it suffices to put more weight
on the smaller σji’s, i.e., more weight on those with more
accurate observations. Technically this result is to be expected.
However, in our context it points to the following interesting
interpretation: more reputable users (higher rˆAj ) should only
be given higher weights if they also have more accurate
observations (smaller σji), which may or may not be the case.
This is a scenario where reputation itself should not carry more
voting power. Otherwise the system is better off assigning
equal weights to all.
VI. A HETEROGENEOUS SCENARIO
So far we have only considered homogeneous sets of users.
In this section, we consider a simple heterogeneous setting:
of the K users, T of them are of the truth type, with utility
functions given by (3), while I = K − T are of the image
type, with utility functions given by:
(Model IV) ui = gi(rˆAi ) . (17)
Specifically, we study the inefficiency resulting from naively
adopting the Absolute Scoring mechanism.
A. Image type users
A user Ni in I will choose its self-report so as to achieve
maxxii E[vi]. Solving this optimization problem assuming
R0i ∼ N (rii, σ2) results in:
x∗ii = {x : g′i(x) = 2(x− rii)} .
As expected, Ni’s strategy depends on its valuation of an
inflated reputation index, i.e., it depends on the functional
form of gi(·), with the interpretation that Ni will inflate its
report as long as the marginal increase in tax payment is no
more than the marginal gain from an inflated report. In the
special case of gi(x) = x, the optimal self-report is given by
x∗ii = min{rii + 12 , 1}.
We next verify the individual rationality condition for these
participants. The biased self-report resulting from the opti-
mization problem is given by x∗ii = rii +
g′i(x
∗
ii)
2 . Thus the
utility in staying out or participating is, respectively:
U
{Out}
i = E(gi(R0i)) ≤ gi(rii) (by concavity of gi(·))
U
{In}
i = gi(x
∗
ii)−
(g′i(x
∗
ii))
2
4
+
1
K − 1
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
E[(g′j(x
∗
jj))
2]
4
.
Ni has incentive to participate if U
{in}
i ≥ U{Out}i , a condition
highly dependent on the specifics of the system. We will look
at one example in detail in VI-D.
B. Truth type users
It is obvious that a user Ni in T will choose its self-
report truthfully, i.e., x∗ii = rii. The complication, however,
is in ensuring that this user has an incentive to participate.
Intuitively, the problem arises from the presence of image
type users who introduce inaccuracy in the reputation system,
making Ni less interested in (trusting of) the outcome, and
consequently less likely to participate. We formalize this
intuition as follows.
First suppose user Ni decides to stay out. If Ni has its own
unbiased cross-observations (assuming at no additional cost),
the expected utility of Ni from staying out is given by:
U
{Out}
i = −
∑
j 6=i
E[fi(|Rij − rjj |)] .
Next, consider the expected payoff from participation. The
simplified expression is given by:7
U
{In}
i = −
∑
j∈I
(
E[fi(|x∗jj − rjj |)]
− 1
K − 1E[|x
∗
jj −R0j |2]
)
− I
K − 1σ
2 .
A user Ni has an incentive to participate if U
{in}
i ≥ U{Out}i ,
a condition dependent on the specific R, functional forms of
fi(·) and gi(·), and σ2 of the system. A concrete example is
given in VI-D.
7Assuming all cross-observations have the same variance σ2.
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C. Effects on the system performance
We now consider whether the implementation of the AS
mechanism in such a heterogeneous environment will improve
upon the direct observations of the reputation system. For
comparison, consider a reputation system that simply assigns
the reputations rˆAi = R0i, ∀i ∈ K. The performance of this
mechanism according to (1) will be
√
2
piKσ. On the other
hand, the performance of the AS mechanism is given by:∑
i∈K
|rˆAi − rii| =
∑
i∈I
g′i(rii)
2
.
Thus such implementation is profitable if:∑
i∈I
g′i(rii) < 2
√
2
pi
Kσ .
D. Example: fi(x) = x2 and gi(x) = x
Recall that the optimal self-report for a user Nj in I is (at
most) x∗jj = rjj+
1
2 . We can thus simplify the expected utility
expressions in VI-B to get:
U
{Out}
i = −(K − 1)σ2 .
U
{In}
i = −
I
4
(1− 1
K − 1) .
Therefore, Ni has an incentive to participate if:
I
K − 1 ≤ 4
K − 1
K − 2σ
2
Define ρ := IK−1 as the (estimated) fraction of the image
type users. The following condition is thus sufficient to guar-
antee voluntary participation by a truth type Ni:
ρ ≤ 4σ2 .
This result coincides with our initial intuition: the higher
the percentage of image type users (larger ρ), the less likely
is a truth type user to participate. Also, given a high accuracy
in a truth type’s own cross-observations (smaller σ2), this in-
dividual is less interested in participating in a crowd-sourcing
mechanism.
We next check whether the image type users have an
incentive to participate. Using the expressions obtained in
VI-A, we see that an image type Ni has an incentive to
participate if:
max{rii + 1
2
, 1} − rii ≥ 1
4
T
K − 1 .
It is easy to see that the image type users with rii ≤ 0.5
always have the incentive to participate in the mechanism. On
the other hand, the participation of higher quality image type
users, with rii > 0.5, is harder to guarantee. Define γ := TK−1
as the fraction of the truth type users. Such high quality Ni
will choose to participate in the mechanism if:
γ ≤ 4(1− rii) .
The intuition behind this result is the following: due to the
bias introduced by Ni, the expected tax payment of this user is
positive, unless there are many other image type participants
(small γ), such that the reallocation of their paid taxes will
offset this payment. The lower the reputation of Ni (smaller
rii), the more it hopes to (or the more its potential to) gain
by inflating its report through the proposed mechanism, and
therefore it has more incentive for participation.
Finally, we verify whether implementing the proposed
mechanism is reasonable from the viewpoint of the system.
The performance of the mechanism under the current specifi-
cations is given by:∑
i∈K
|rˆAi − rii| =
∑
i∈I
|rˆAi − rii| <
1
2
I .
Therefore, the following condition is sufficient for the reputa-
tion system to gain:
ρ < 2
√
2
pi
σ .
Intuitively, the benefit of the proposed mechanism is de-
creasing in the accuracy of the estimations (higher σ), and
decreasing in the fraction of image type users.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Other possible environments
We omitted the analysis of a few other possible environ-
ments, including homogeneous environments of image type
users, and heterogeneous environments of image type and
mixed type users. When absolute reputation indices are used,
our analysis of the PR mechanism can be easily extended
to include such scenarios. More specifically, the impossibility
result of Section V continues to hold in the above two cases,
and a similar PR mechanism may be used to obtain sub-
optimal system performance. The challenge in dealing with
the presence of image type users lies in the fact that as
the fraction of mixed type users (if present) decreases, the
available valid cross-observations also decrease. Even though
as noted in Section V the PR mechanism can operate using
only the system’s observations, the decreased accuracy of the
aggregate cross-report degrades the system performance.
In general the image element of a utility function introduces
additional complexity to the problem even when all users
are of the same, mixed type. To further illustrate, consider
the following homogeneous environment with the mixed-type
utility function of proportional indices:
ui = −
∑
j 6=i
fi(|rˆRj −
rjj∑
k rkk
|) + gi(rˆRi ) . (18)
This model bears similarity to existing resource allocation
problems, see e.g. [3], [22], with one fundamental difference
that has to do with the relationship between the users’ utility
and the system or global objective. In the existing literature,
the global objective of the centralized allocation problem
(or the social choice rule) is often taken to be the sum of
individual utilities. The desired outcome is then induced by
aligning individual users’ objectives with the social choice
rule using taxation. All allocation mechanisms that are based
on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [9], [18] mechanism
are examples of this approach, see e.g., [22]. For the utility
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function in (18), this approach is not applicable due to the
presence of the extra term gi(rˆRi ).
More precisely, consider a direct mechanism where all users
Nj disclose rjj as part of their message space, but Ni has
unilaterally deviated to reporting xii 6= rii. Let’s see how
Ni’s utility changes when deviating:
vi(xii, {rkk}k 6=i)− vi({rkk}Kk=1) =
−
∑
j 6=i
fi(| rjj(xii−rii)(xii+∑
k 6=i rkk)(
∑
k
rkk)
|)−
∑
j 6=i
fi(0))

+
(
gi(
xii
xii+
∑
k 6=i rkk
)− gi( rii∑
k
rkk
)
)
− (t(xii)− t(rii)) . (19)
In (19), the first term is always negative since fi(0) ≥ 0 and
increasing; it represents the loss incurred by the inaccuracy
that a false report introduces to the system. The second term
is positive for xii > rii and negative for xii < rii. This term
captures the profit from an inflated report xii and thus an
inflated rˆRi . The last term, which can be used if required, is
the difference between the tax paid by Ni in the two cases.
Depending on the functions fi(·) and gi(·), two scenarios
are possible regardless of the form of the taxation.
Case I: These functions are such that the benefit from in-
creased rˆRi is not worth the loss in the system accuracy. In this
case the users will not deviate from truth-telling and therefore
the centralized solution is implementable. For example, it can
be shown that the centralized solution is implementable in the
special case of fi(|x|) = |x| and gi(x) = x, using the Absolute
Scoring mechanism but with a proportional allocation rule.
Case II: There is a net benefit resulting from the first two
terms in (19). In this case the tax terms can be chosen so as to
ensure truth-telling, and the individual rationality and budget
balance constraints have to be carefully addressed which can
be done for specific choices of fi(·) and gi(·).
B. Taxation: interpretation & implementation
The AS mechanism introduced in Section III relies on tax-
ation to induce truth revelation. It finds natural interpretation
and plausible implementation in both our application contexts.
In the case of online shopping, the shopping site runs the
reputation system and can implement the taxes as a form of
user (seller and buyer)-specific transaction/service surcharge
or credit. Again as the mechanism is budget balanced, the site
retains no money from this surcharge; it is merely a means
to induce desired behavior by reallocating the money among
users. In the case of network reputation, taxation may be
implemented in a number of ways. One way is that networks
might charge each other a premium (or give each other credit)
for access to content depending on the taxation amount.
Another method by which taxation might be implemented is
in the negotiation of peering policies.
C. Different types of leverage and the effect of externalities
As mentioned in Section II-B, mechanism design typically
relies on some form of leverage to induce desired behavior,
taxation being a very common one. Below we identify a few
other factors inherent in the model that serve as leverage
our mechanisms take advantage of. The first concerns the
difference between the absolute and proportional indices. With
absolute indices, unilateral deviation to inflate one’s reputation
does not result in loss of accuracy in estimates of other users,
while with proportional indices the increased index comes at
the cost of accuracy to the system or the user itself. As a
result proportional reputation carries leverage for the system
when combined with the truth element; this is seen in the
case of all truth type users (Section IV, where under the FR
mechanism taxation is not needed due to sufficient leverage
introduced by proportional indexing compared to absolute
indexing), and in the case of all mixed type users (Section
VII-A, where implementation of the centralized solution is
feasible using taxation compared to the impossibility result
for absolute indexing).
To further illustrate the difference between absolute and
proportional indices, we point out that the problems studied
herein, for both the absolute and proportional reputation set-
tings, bear resemblance to public good problems, in that the
vector of reputations affects the utility of all users simultane-
ously. It is known that uncoordinated markets result in ineffi-
ciency in the provision of a public good [18]. Consequently,
any proposed mechanism has to “internalize the externalities”
in order to provide the optimal level of public good, here the
reputation indices. To this end, the AS mechanism requires
users to pay according to the negative externality they impose
on others due to their inaccurate self-reports. On the other
hand, the use of proportional reputations together with the
truth element in users’ utilities automatically internalizes the
externalities, removing the need for additional taxation (the
FR mechanism).
Any independent observation the reputation system pos-
sesses, and the public knowledge of its possession of such
information, can also serve as a powerful threat to the users to
not deviate, leading to simpler mechanisms and better system
performance. It is in particular indispensable in dealing with
image type users, as pointed out in VII-A. The presence of
the truth element in users’ utilities may simplify a mechanism
by removing the need for independent observations.
D. Malicious users
Throughout Sections III-VI, in both homogeneous and
heterogeneous scenarios, we focused on users whose utility
function can be described by the truth and/or image elements
introduced in Section II. These elements do not necessarily
capture the strategic behavior of malicious users, whose utility
functions, and thus their strategic reports, may or may not
be known to the reputation system. Without introducing a
concrete rational model for a malicious user, here we briefly
discuss the effect of random reporting as a form of malicious
behavior (mischievous is perhaps a better word).
Random self-reports: We consider a heterogeneous scenario
consisting of malicious users and truth type users, where the
Absolute Scoring mechanism is used. This analysis will in
turn allow for a comparison between the effects of random
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participation and the targeted strategic behavior of the image
type (Section VI). We can show that in many scenarios,
including the example in VI-D, image type users are more
detrimental to the system’s accuracy as compared to malicious
users with random reports, since they are specifically choosing
self-reports that cause inaccuracy in the system.
Random cross-reports: In reputation systems that rely on
cross-observations (e.g. the PR mechanism), random cross-
reports pose a different dilemma for the reputation system.
While the increased number of cross-reports increases the
accuracy of the reputation mechanism, collecting random
reports in this process will inevitably hurt the performance
by degrading the quality of the aggregated cross-observation.
E. Dealing with Collusion
We now briefly discuss the handling of collusion/cliques.
Without establishing a formal way of analyzing collusion in
this context, we note that our mechanisms possess features
that can naturally prevent or reduce the effect of collusion.
The Absolute Scoring and Fair Ranking mechanisms (Sec-
tions III and IV) are naturally collusion-proof: they either
do not require cross-reports, or use the system’s indepen-
dent observations to incentivize truthful input. Consequently,
collusion cannot be used to inflate one’s own reputations or
degrading others’.
Consider now the Punish Reward (PR) mechanism (Sec-
tion V). Participation of clique members who provide unfair
high/low cross-reports may disrupt the performance of this
mechanism (which in the absence of cliques outperforms the
simple averaging mechanism, the mechanism currently used
at eBay). However, the PR mechanism can remain functional
using only the cross-observations from a subset of trusted
entities, or even with a single observation by the reputation
system. The PR mechanism with one or limited truthful input
can prevent both slandering and promoting attacks. Also, given
enough truthful input, PR results in a more accurate outcome
than simply averaging the cross-observations from all users,
some of which may be part of a clique.
Finally, if the system lacks independent observations, intro-
ducing randomness in the mechanisms can reduce the impact
of cliques. To illustrate, consider the extended-AS mechanism
(Section III), where each user is charged according to the inac-
curacy of its self-report when compared to a randomly selected
peer. The extended-AS in its current form is vulnerable to
collusion, since members of a clique can attack the mechanism
by agreeing on inflating each other’s reputations, or by bashing
other users to extract revenue from the redistributed taxes.
To reduce the profitability of forming cliques, we can
impose additional layers of taxation (not necessarily more
taxes) to the extended-AS mechanism. We illustrate this idea
using two layers of taxation. Assume a user Ni is further
charged based on the discrepancy between its cross-report
xi(i+1) and its predecessor’s cross-report x(i−1)(i+1):
ti = |xii − x(i−1)i| − 1K−2
∑
j 6=i,i+1
|xjj − x(j−1)j |
+|xi(i+1) − x(i−1)(i+1)| − 1K−2
∑
j 6=i,i+1
|xj(j+1) − x(j−1)(j+1)|.
The following proposition verifies that truthful cross-reports
are best-responses to unbiased cross-reports.
Proposition 6: When x(i−1)(i+1) is truthful, |xi(i+1) −
x(i−1)(i+1)| is minimized with a truthful cross-report xi(i+1) =
Ri(i+1).
Proof: Define Z := |xi(i+1)−x(i−1)(i+1)|. We use known
results on folded Normal distributions. If X ∼ N (µ, σ2), the
random variable Y = |X| has a folded Normal distribution,
the expected value of which is given by:
E[Y ] = σ
√
2/pi exp (−µ2/2σ2) + µ(1− 2Φ(−µ/σ)) ,
where Φ(·) denotes the CDF of the standard Normal distribu-
tion.
Assume x(i−1)(i+1) ∼ N (ri+1, σ2) is truthful, and that Ni
manipulates its cross-report such that xi(i+1) = aRi(i+1)+b ∼
N (ari+1 + b, a2σ2). Then:
E[Z] = σˆ
√
2/pi exp (−µˆ2/2σˆ2) + µˆ(1− 2Φ(−µˆ/σˆ)) ,
where µˆ := (a − 1)ri+1 + b and σˆ2 = (1 + a2)σ2. This
expression can be further simplified to:
E[Z] = σˆ
√
2/pi exp (−µˆ2/2σˆ2) + µˆ erf(µˆ/(
√
2σˆ)) ,
E[Z] will be minimized with a = 1 and b = ri+1. Therefore,
Ni’s best-response is xi(i+1) = Ri(i+1).
We note that to increase the randomness in the mechanisms,
and consequently decrease the predictability of being matched
with clique users, each layer of taxation can be assessed
according to a different, undisclosed random ring. This will
help further strengthen the extended-AS mechanism against
collusions. An increased likelihood of being matched with
honest/non-clique users will reduce the benefit of forming
cliques. Thus cliques will have limited benefit unless their
size is comparable to the user population.
F. Consistency with Existing Impossibility Results
Impossibility results in mechanism design specify combi-
nations of properties that no mechanism can satisfy simul-
taneously. The basic approach for establishing such results
is through the revelation principle [20], which states that if
a (possibly indirect) mechanism implements a social choice
function in dominant strategies, then there exists a direct incen-
tive compatible mechanism that implements the same social
choice function in dominant strategies (similarly for BNE).
Inconsistencies can then be found by mathematically check-
ing incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and other
desired properties, in a direct mechanism. Each impossibility
result is derived for a certain solution concept, preference type,
and environment. Impossibility results for weaker solution
concepts, restricted utility types, and restricted environments
are thus stronger, since they include more general settings as
special cases [20].
One of the very first impossibility results is that of Gibbard
[10], which states that when the space of players’ utilities is
sufficiently rich, a social choice function is implementable in
dominant strategies if and only if it is the trivial dictatorial
rule. This is a rather weak impossibility result, as it encom-
passes general user preferences and general environments; it
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is applicable for instance to voting mechanisms where users
are allowed to have general preferences. [10] established the
conjecture that in such general settings, no voting system
is immune to strategic voting. However, in most engineered
systems the preference environments are more structured, such
that implementation of non-dictatorial social choice functions
is often possible.
A stronger version of Gibbard’s impossibility result is that
of Green and Laffont [12]. The authors show that in environ-
ments where the decisions are on the level of a public good and
the amount of individual transfers, and the agents’ utilities are
separable in income (i.e. quasi-linear) with general valuation
functions, the only direct mechanisms that implement an al-
locatively efficient outcome in dominant strategies are Groves
(VCG) mechanisms. Consequently, since VCG mechanisms
are only weakly budget balanced, it is impossible to achieve
efficiency and (strong) budget balance even in quasi-linear
environments.
Green and Laffont’s result is further strengthened by re-
laxing the solution concept to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Myerson [19] shows that in simple-exchange environments
[20] with quasi-linear preferences, it is impossible to achieve
efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality in a
Bayesian Nash incentive compatible mechanism.
A more recent result by Jackson [15] closes the gap between
necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian implemen-
tation in economic environments (including environments in
which there are public goods and/or externalities). In such
environments with 3 or more players, a social choice function
is implementable in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only
if incentive compatibility, closure, and Bayesian monotonicity
conditions are satisfied.
At first sight, these impossibility results (especially [12],
[19]) may seem contradictory to our efficient, individually
rational, budget balanced, direct AS and FR mechanisms. It
should be noted however that we are restricting attention to a
specific class of valuation functions (rather than quasi-linear
utilities with general valuation functions). Therefore we are
able to find non-VCG mechanisms achieving the aforemen-
tioned properties. On the other hand, the impossibility result
of [15] is indeed applicable in Section V, which justifies the
search for suboptimal mechanism, such as the PR mechanism.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The theory of mechanism design, originally proposed for
problems in the economic literature, has been increasingly
used to address problems of resource allocation in informa-
tionally decentralized systems with strategic users. Pricing
schemes, e.g. [17], and auctions, e.g. [3], are two popular
approaches in the design of allocation schemes in communi-
cation systems. The use of pricing allows the system to align
individual users’ objectives with global performance goals to
implement socially optimal outcomes. Taxation may be viewed
as a form of pricing, which we have used in Section III.
Despite the feasibility of using monetary taxation in our
setting (see Section VII-B), alternative forms of leverage are
usually preferred in incentivizing user cooperation though
they are relatively hard to identify; two notable exceptions
are [22], [27]. In [22], the authors study the problem of
using the downlink rate allocated to a user as an alternative
commodity to induce socially optimal uplink rate allocation in
a multi-access broadcast channel with selfish users, while [27]
proposes an intervention mechanism that uses the commodity
of interest as the means for preventing users’ deviation from
their designated strategies. Specifically, a monitoring device is
used to estimate the transmit power profile of selfish users in
a wireless network; it then chooses to transmit at a positive
power level if users deviate to higher transmission powers,
thus negatively affecting users’ utilities. The PR mechanism
in Section V also relies on a credible threat of punishment
to deter non-cooperative users from deviation. However, the
above intervention mechanism can only exercise punishment
while our PR mechanism can also reward users’ cooperative
actions using the commodity of interest.
The work presented in this paper is also closely related to
elicitation and prediction mechanisms used for aggregating the
predictions of agents about an event, see e.g. [11], [21], [26].
Scoring rules [26] incentivize an agent to truthfully reveal its
prediction by offering rewards based on the accuracy of the
agent’s estimation as compared to the actual realization of
the event. Although these rules can be used to quantify the
performance of forecasters, they rely on the observation of
an objective ground truth. A class of peer prediction methods
can be used to eliminate the need for such verification by
requesting an agent’s own assessment, as well as its predic-
tion of other agent’s assessment. For example, the elicitation
methods in [21] and [11] result in truthful revelation even for
subjective assessments. However, in all aforementioned works,
the users are essentially rewarded in accordance with their
participation, but do not attach any value to the realization of
the event, or the outcome that the elicitor may be building
using the aggregated data. Among our proposed models,
Model I resembles this line of work due to the absence of
an image element in users’ utilities. Consequently, users do
not attach value to the outcome that is built using their inputs,
i.e., the reputation index derived from their self-report. The AS
mechanism is nevertheless different, in that users receive non-
monetary rewards (a vector of accurate reputation indices) by
participation, whereas in elicitation methods monetary rewards
are used to incetivize cooperation. Furthermore, although we
are studying a problem of elicitation about an objective ground
truth, this event is not observable by the elicitor.
There has also been a large volume of literature on the use
of reputation in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems and other related
social network settings, including but not limited to, blogs,
forums [16], and corporate wikis [6] that depend heavily on
user contribution, opportunistic forwarding networks [4], trust
management in ad-hoc networks [5], and the like. Specifically,
a large population, the anonymity of individuals in such social
settings, and the lack of proper rewards make it difficult to
sustain cooperative behavior among self-interested individuals
[13], [16]. Reputation has thus been used in such systems
as an incentive mechanism for individuals to cooperate and
behave according to a certain social norm in general [16],
[28], and to reciprocate in P2P systems in particular. While
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the focus of social network studies is on the effect of changing
reputation on individuals, the focus of our study is on how to
make reputations an accurate representation of a user’s quality.
Accordingly, our emphasis is on how to incentivize participa-
tion from users, and whether the system could obtain the true
quality of the users. Furthermore, observations in our system
are noisy and incomplete, while they are typically assumed
to be perfect in P2P systems as they are based on direct
or indirect personal/social reciprocation [8], [24]. Finally, we
have aimed to incentivize truthful cross-observations, while
the schemes in [4]–[6] either rely on external verification
mechanisms to enforce truthful reports, or do not explicitly
address the truthfulness of such reports.
In addition to incentivizing participation from all users in-
volved in an interaction, another main feature of our proposed
mechanisms is the balance between transparency and robust-
ness: a simple reputation system provides clarity for users to
decide about participation and allows easy interpretation of
results, while sufficient built-in robustness prevents the system
from being manipulated by strategic users. This approach
is different from the commonly used idea of “security by
obscurity”, i.e., keeping (some parameters of) a sophisticated
reputation system confidential so as to hinder manipulation
and maintain robustness, which has been advocated by Jøsang
et al. in [16], and is currently being used in various reputation
systems, including Amazon’s reviewers’ rankings, Google’s
PageRank, and the product review site Epinions [16].
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the problem of designing reputation
mechanisms that can incentivize users to participate in a
collective effort of determining their quality assessment. We
introduced a number of utility models representing users’
strategic behavior, each consisting of one or both of a truth
element and an image element, reflecting the user’s desire to
obtain an accurate view of the other and an inflated image
of itself. We demonstrated the feasibility of achieving socially
optimal solutions under various combinations of user utility
types by incentivizing accurate or useful input in a direct
mechanism. We also presented suboptimal mechanisms when
the environment is such that it is infeasible to achieve the
globally optimal solution.
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